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Benefit-sharing agreements are negotiated between the jurisdiction that the genetic material is sourced from and the organisation using it. These are commercial contracts and normal commercial practice applies regarding intellectual property (emphasis added).
5
The article is structured as follows: the next part addresses the "market failure" for biodiversity conservation and the incentive theory that justifies the regulation of access and benefit-sharing in Australia. The following part outlines the regulation of access and benefit-sharing in Australia and the role and place of patents. This is really setting the scene and the context for the agreements between the resource holders and bio-prospectors that include terms and conditions about patents, and specifically the contractual arrangements: first the Craig Venter Institute contract and then the Griffith and AstraZeneca Partnership agreement(s). These examples were chosen because, in the case of the Craig Venter Institute contract, it has been made publicly available, and the Griffith University and AstraZeneca Partnership, because a review was funded by the Commonwealth Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts to support the Australian Government's contention about the benefits delivered by it's access and benefit-sharing regulation.
6 Both these examples demonstrate that there is little evidence that benefits actually flow to conservers and curators of in situ biodiversity (such as protected areas). The article then concludes that there are credible questions about whether there really are benefits from these arrangements. This is a significant concern because if attempts to regulate access and benefit sharing merely impose additional costs and inefficiencies on the transactions (a regulatory burden) without benefits flowing through to promoting biodiversity conservation, then other more efficient and efficient regulatory mechanisms 7 should be considered. 5
The "market failure" and biodiversity conservation incentives
As a generalisation, market based economies like Australia have addressed biodiversity conservation as a market failure. 8 This approach reflects the theory that the benefits of biological diversity conservation accrue to society and cannot be sufficiently captured by those likely to undertake the conservation -the marginal private returns from conservation activities do not correspond with their marginal social returns favouring biological diversity destruction and decline. 9 In addressing the market failure Australia has adopted a range of methods to incentivise biodiversity conservation. Significantly, in determining an access and benefit-sharing scheme implementing the CBD's obligations and applying to the Commonwealth, there were four "overarching principles, or desirable features" including that the regulation "provide incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
7
For our purposes patents are a part of the price for access. 16 Typically this will be an agreement where the contract will set out that if any of the accessed materials are subject to a patent then the parties agree to share some of the benefits that flow from the commercialisation of the patent protected product or process. 17 Typically this will be a share of royalties, but it can also include sharing patent protected technology, access to know how, training, and so on (addressed further below). So the particular patent contribution, at least in theory, is by capturing some of the value from innovative, creative and useful applications of the accessed biological resources and returning this as part of the price paid for access. Importantly, not only do patents contribute to the price, they also contribute to the incentive to conserve biodiversity by privatising some of the value. Recall that the solution to the market failure for biodiversity conservation was to allow part of the social value for individual economic activities to be appropriated, thus compensating those likely to undertake the conservation activities, and providing an incentive to undertake future conservation activities.
This theory provides a measure against which the policy and implementation of access and benefit-sharing arrangements can be assessed: whether the marginal private returns from conservation activities are sufficient to at least correspond with their marginal social returns? If the private returns are less, then the destruction and decline of biological resource stock, rather than its conservation, can be expected. To be effective in addressing biodiversity conservation the private returns need, in large part, to be in money to pay for fences, eradicating weeds, controlling feral animals, establishing protected areas, and so on. These aspects are considered in the context of 16 The intended relationship between intellectual property and biodiversity conservation is that:
"Patents and other forms of intellectual property then take their place and role in delivering a part of the compensation (and incentive) contributing to the marginal private return. This is achieved, at least in theory, by capturing some of the value from innovative, creative and useful applications of the accessed biological resources and returning this as part of the price paid for access and use of the (1)) and for commercial or potential commercial uses of the accessed materials a benefit-sharing agreement between the parties is required based on "terms mutually agreed", "adequate benefit-sharing arrangements including, that if practicable, some benefits would be used for biodiversity conservation in the area from which the resource was obtained" and "prior informed consent of any Indigenous owners". 22 The model contracts (merely suggestions as a starting place for negotiation) for the access and benefit-sharing agreement address benefits for the use of Indigenous knowledge, threshold payments (for example, pharmaceutical, nutraceutical or agricultural purposes then payments, for gross revenue received from commercialisation of nil for less than AUD$500 000, 2.5% for between AUD$500 000 -5 000 000 and 5% for more than AUD$5 000 000 (~US$4 500 000 million; ~€2 500 000), and various additional benefits including ad hoc research, research funding to a local research institution, joint ventures with an Australian research institution or an Australian company, capacity building, technology transfer and scientific research and development programmes. 23 The model contract also addresses "proposals to benefit biodiversity conservation in [the] access area" and provides:
Benefits may include (but are not limited to) improved knowledge of: biodiversity; taxonomy; biological and ecological processes; impacts of environmental change; or data and knowledge that will assist in the conservation and management of the environment. To date there is no record that amounts have been paid according to these agreements.
Further, any monies received by the Commonwealth would go straight to the consolidated revenue, and would need to be appropriation. 28 There are no appropriations of any monies hypothecated from access and benefit sharing arrangements for any particular conservation activities (such as a 'Special Account" associated with access and benefit-sharing agreements).
Under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulations 2000
(Cth) r 8A.05 (1) 
Domestic regulation of patents
The Commonwealth's Patents Act 1990 (Cth) is a statutory scheme conferring a privilege to dealings with the idea in the patent protected product or process together with control over how the patent protected product or process is used. The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) threshold requirements are: a "patentable invention" and this includes almost any product or process; novelty; inventive step (non-obviousness) and a description of the invention so that others can perform the invention (s 18). Once these threshold requirements are satisfied the applicant gets a patent and "the exclusive rights, during the term of the patent, to exploit the invention and to authorise another person to exploit the invention" (s 13). The "exclusive rights are personal property and are capable of assignment and of devolution by law" and comprise, for 20-25 years, to "make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of these things" and use the method or process or do any of these things with the product of the method or process (s 13 and sch 1). "performance" incentives aligned with the outcomes and outputs. 30 The important point here is that the Commissioner's incentives are directed to the "customers" applying for patents, and she has absolutely no concerns about environmental perspectives and the interaction between patents and biodiversity conservation imperatives. At the time the Commonwealth's access and benefit-sharing regulation was still being negotiated and did not commence until 1 December 2005. 34 The recitals indicate that the agreement was negotiated in contemplation of the CBD's commitments and Australia's adoption of the Bonn Guidelines that formed the foundation for the later regulatory scheme:
B -As a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Australia is committed to the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of its components, and equitable sharing of benefits derived from its use, and has embraced the "Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic which were adopted by the CBD Conference of the Parties in 2002.
C -The Collaborator is undertaking a global sampling expedition to survey microorganisms that live in the oceans, and in some places soils, to better understand overall species diversity, discover and characterize new bacterial and viral species, evaluate the ecological roles that dominant (but generally unculturable) microbes play in the ecosystem, and establish a freely shared, global environmental genomics database that can be used by scientists around the world for any purpose.
… E -Australia seeks to maximise the benefits to the nation arising from allowing access to its biodiversity, from access to the genomic data reflecting the biodiversity of other nations, and from contributing with other nations to a freely-shared global environmental genomics database; such benefits specifically including improvements in Australia's knowledge base about its own biodiversity and its capacity for effective conservation, and research and development participation by Australian individuals and organisations.
The intellectual property provisions provided: The phrase "intellectual property" was defined to mean:
1.1(h) … statutory and other proprietary rights in respect of copyright and neighbouring rights; all rights in relation to inventions, patents, plant varieties, registered and unregistered trade marks, registered and unregistered designs, circuit layouts and confidential information, but does not include moral rights that are not transferable.
14 Essentially, in return for permission to collect the samples, Venter agreed that the Materials and Results would vest in Australia, and that any intellectual property arising for any uses of the Materials or Results will also vest in Australia.
The "Approved Research" under the contract was to:
Inventory the microorganisms that live in oceans within Australia's jurisdiction, and in soils in some places within Australia or its Territories, to better understand overall species diversity, discover and characterize new bacterial and viral species, evaluate the ecological roles that dominant (but generally unculturable) microbes play in the ecosystem, and establish and publish a freely shared, global environmental genomics database that can be freely used by any person or entity.
The results of the research were then made freely available through the Community Cyberinfrastructure for Advanced Marine Microbial Ecology Research and Analysis database (or CAMERA database) at the website http://camera.calit2.net/. 35 One of the conditions of using the database is:
As a condition of my use of the CAMERA website, I acknowledge and agree that the genetic information available through the CAMERA website may be considered to be part of the genetic patrimony of the country from which the sample was obtained. As a user, I agree to: (1) acknowledge the country of origin in any publications where the genetic information is presented;
(2) contact the CBD focal point identified on the CBD website if I intend to use the genetic information for commercial purposes.
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The "the CBD focal point identified on the CBD website" (or "CBD NFP") for The reports also state that AstraZeneca invested more than AUD$100 million during the term of the partnership, that was spent as follows: AUD$45 million to build the research unit at Griffith University; AUD$9 million annually to running costs; and AUD$9 million for the collection of samples by partner institutions. 44 The monetary benefits were reported as fees for samples (or to cover the costs of an agreed-upon work plan) and royalties, and royalties that may or may not materialize (noting that
none have yet). 45 The non-monetary benefits were reported as the provision of vehicles, equipment, technology, training, building of a state-of-the-art natural product discovery unit, and increased knowledge of biodiversity. 46 More generally the cited benefits were:
The immunity, neglected diseases, neurodegenerative diseases, and stem cell biology.
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The intellectual property arrangements and whether any monies are provided to conservers and curators of in situ biodiversity from where these samples were collected are unclear.
Australian government access and benefit-sharing policy A significant part in understanding the role and place of patents is the policy environment and the conception of patents as a part of conserving biodiversity. As set out about, in addressing the market failure Australia has adopted a range of methods to incentivise biodiversity conservation, including patents as a contribution to the price for access. The concern is that patents are an economic instrument directed to incentivising innovation and creation, and bringing new products and services to markets that overturn concentrations of market power. Australia's Biological Diversity (1996) expressly recognised that conflicts between biodiversity conservation and other policy prescriptions was a concern:
The development of integrated policies for major uses of biological resources is necessary to coordinate activities within and between all levels of government, to ensure that the full social and (5)).
Discussion
This article shows that patents are involved in the debates about biodiversity conservation and that there is some useful thinking about their role and effectiveness from an economic perspective. To be effective the benefits flowing from access and benefit-sharing contracts need to be private returns that, in large part, are money to pay for fences, eradicating weeds, controlling feral animals, establishing protected areas, and so on. Monetary and non-monetary benefits in this case fall within the standard package for "best practice", but it is in the accumulated and multi-faceted nature of the benefits that the real gains for the State and country are to be found. These include the collections and compound libraries, the advanced natural product discovery unit, and the enormous gains in taxonomic and ecological understanding that resulted from the collections. This case demonstrates that these benefits can be of equal, or greater, importance to the potential monetary benefits from royalties should a product be commercialized. On this basis, the other uses of the oceans and waterways, like fishing, mining, and so on, look like much better prospects and much more likely uses of these oceans and waterways than biodiversity conservation. In other words, the social returns are good, but the private returns appear very limited. Significantly, however, this agreement maintains control over intellectual property with the prospect of intellectual property contributing to future private returns. And from the Griffith and AstraZeneca
Partnership the price paid of AUS$100 million over 14 years with a whole range of benefits in equipment, technology, training, and increased knowledge of biodiversity, and so on, but less that AUD$9 million has gone to those actually conserving biodiversity in the form of royalties for collection. 60 Again, the social returns are commendable, but the private returns are limited. And again, the other uses of the lands like farming, forestry, mining, and so on, look like much better prospects and much more likely uses of those lands than biodiversity conservation. Significantly, this partnership gave away control over intellectual property to AstraZeneca with no prospect of intellectual property contributing to future private returns to conservators from AstraZeneca. Presumably, the current holders of this collection, the Eskitis Institute for Cell and Molecular Therapies, have the ability to control some intellectual property claims although it is not clear whether they would transfer any monetary benefits to conservators.
61
The other conclusion from this article's analysis is that the policy integrating biodiversity conservation and patents do not appear to be in harmony, with a preference for maintaining exiting patent standard irrespective of their consequences for biodiversity conservation. This is making no judgement about whether investment, and scaring investors with weaker patents, should over-ride biodiversity conservation.
Rather the conclusion is that preferring patents to biodiversity conservation has 60 See ibid 30. 61 See http://www.griffith.edu.au/science/eskitis-institute-cell-molecular-therapies (last visited 8 September 2010).
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consequences for biodiversity conservation and this is about its destruction and decline.
Importantly, this article shows that there are credible questions about whether there really are private returns from these arrangements accessing biodiversity and whether patents are contributing positively. But, most significantly, this article demonstrates that attempts to regulate access and benefit sharing appear to merely impose additional costs and inefficiencies on the transactions (a regulatory burden) without benefits flowing through to promoting biodiversity conservation. If this is accepted, other more effective and efficient regulatory mechanisms need to be considered.
The recent conclusion of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 62 while heralding a consensus, probably has few consequences for the likely benefits actually flowing from accessed genetic resources.
The major impact of this protocol is likely to be only on the need to address traditional knowledge (where relevant) and ensure that accessed materials are adequately documented in their subsequent uses. The protocol is neither binding nor prescriptive about the form or content of benefits that should be addressed in access and benefit sharing arrangements.
62 See note 2, supra.
